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Fake followers are those Twitter accounts created to inflate
the number of followers of a target account. Fake follow-
ers are dangerous to the social platform and beyond, since
they may alter concepts like popularity and influence in the
Twittersphere—hence impacting on economy, politics, and
Society. In this paper, we provide several contributions. First,
we review the most relevant existing criteria (proposed by
Academia and Media) for anomalous Twitter accounts de-
tection, and later we assess their capability to detect fake
followers. In particular, we contribute with the creation of
a gold standard of verified human, as well as with a set of
known fake accounts. We test the above cited criteria against
these two data sets, showing that the analyzed mechanisms
provide unsatisfactory performance in revealing fake follow-
ers. Moreover, building upon these results, we also introduce
a novel taxonomy to discriminate fake followers from legit-
imate ones and spammers. The findings reported in this pa-
per, other than being supported by a thorough experimental
methodology and being interesting on their own, also pave
the way for further investigation.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
[Security and privacy – Social network security
and privacy]
Keywords
Twitter, fake followers detection, gold standard, taxon-
omy
1. INTRODUCTION
Originally started as a personal microblogging site,
Twitter has been transformed by common use to an in-
formation publishing venue. As of March, 2013, statis-
tics reported 500 million of Twitter subscribers, with
some 170 billion (> 239) of tweets sent [15]. Twitter
annual advertising revenue in 2013 has been estimated
to $399,500.000 [18]. Popular public characters, such
as actors and singers, as well as traditional mass me-
dia (radio, tv, and newspapers) use Twitter as a new
media channel. Politicians commit a notable part of
their campaigning to their Twitter home pages, as it
happened for the last US presidential and Italian gen-
eral election events [22]. As a consequence, the Twitter
platform has raised the attention of Industry and Busi-
ness as well, with some (if not all) of the most famous
brands massively using this platform for business pro-
motion [3].
Such a versatility and spread of use have made Twit-
ter the ideal arena for proliferation of anomalous ac-
counts, that behave in unconventional ways. Academia
has focused its attention on spammers, that is those
accounts actively putting their efforts in spreading mal-
ware, sending spam and advertising activities of doubt-
ful legality [25, 9, 21, 5]. Very often, to enhance the
effectiveness of spammers, they are armed with auto-
mated twitting programs, known as bots. However,
note that such automated pieces of software could be
designed and used to post legitimate tweets as well—
such as news updates.
Recently, media have started reporting that the ac-
counts of politicians, celebrities, and popular brands
featured a suspicious inflation of followers [6, 12, 7].
So called fake followers correspond to Twitter accounts
specifically exploited to increase the number of follow-
ers of a target account. As an example, during the
last 2012 US election campaign, the Twitter account of
challenger Romney experienced a sudden jump in the
number of followers. The great majority of them has
been later claimed to be fake [12]. Similarly, before the
last general elections in Italy took place (on the 25th
of February 2013), online blogs and newspapers had re-
ported statistical data over a supposed percentage of
fakes of major candidates [23].
At a first glance, acquiring fake followers could seem a
practice limited to foster one’s vanity—a maybe ques-
tionable, but harmless practice. However, deepening
the analysis reveals that artificially inflating the num-
ber of followers can also be finalized to make an account
more trustworthy and influential, in order to stand from
the crowd and to attract other genuine followers. In-
deed, the more the supposed influence, the more those
accounts with lots of followers will likely interfere with
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the genuine followers. Similarly, if the practice were
adopted by spammers, it could act as a way to post
more authoritative messages and launch more effective
advertising campaigns. The outcome could be the alter-
ation of the concepts of popularity and influence in the
Twittersphere, leading to formation of fictitious public
opinion and possible impact on real world economy and
Society. That is why fake followers detection is an
issue worth addressing.
Fake followers detection seems to be an easy task for
many bloggers, that suggest their “golden rules” and
provide a series of criteria, to be used as red flags to
classify a twitter account behavior. However, such rules
are usually paired neither with analytic algorithms to
aggregate them, nor with validation mechanisms. As
for Academia, researchers have focused mainly on spam
and bot detection, with brilliant results characterizing
Twitter accounts based on their (non)-human features.
To the best of our knowledge, however, there is a lack
of analysis on fake followers characterization and detec-
tion. Moreover, most of the scientific studies generates
a classifier to discriminate twitter accounts. The clas-
sifier is built as follows: researchers manually test the
nature of a set of accounts, that, upon testing, becomes
the training set for a machine learning-based classifier.
The intuitive drawback is that humans are not error-
free, and, thus, the manual classification phase is both
error prone and time consuming. This latter drawback
severely limiting the size of the data set taken used for
the training.
Contributions
The goal of this work is to shed light on the phenomenon
of fake followers, aiming at overcoming current limita-
tions in their classification and detection. In particular,
we provide several contributions. First, we provide a
reference set of Twitter accounts, a so-called gold stan-
dard, where humans and fakes are known a priori. Sec-
ond, we test several proposed methodologies for bot and
spam detection on our gold standard. The outcome of
the analysis leads us to assert that fake detection is a
different task than that of spambot detection. Fake fol-
lowers deserve other specialized mechanisms. Last, but
not least, we provide a taxonomy depicting the main
differences between spambots, humans, and fake fol-
lowers, using several features as dimensional spaces to
accurately classify where the accounts lie.
Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 considers related work in the area of Twit-
ter spam and bot detection. Section 3 describes our
reference dataset. In Section 4, we concentrate on a set
of criteria for anomalous account detection. The out-
come of the application of the criteria over our reference
dataset is described in Section 5. Section 6 depicts a
novel taxonomy of Twitter followers. Finally, Section 7
concludes the paper. An Appendix is provided to detail
the detection criteria.
2. RELATEDWORK
In this section, we revise recent work in the area
of spam and automation detection of user behavior on
Twitter.
The work in [21] presents an analysis on how spam-
mers operate on Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace. For
data gathering, the authors created a large set of honey
profiles on the three social platforms, logged the kind of
contacts and messages that they received, and manually
analyzed the collected data. The analysis reported that
the suspicious accounts shared some common traits, for-
malized by the authors in a set of features. They served
as input to a machine learning based classifier [], to
take automatic decisions over a large set of unknown
accounts. Impressively, such an approach led to the de-
tection of more than 15k spam profiles, that Twitter
promptly deleted.
In [25], the authors observe that the more researchers
and engineers make progress in keeping Twitter a spam-
free online community, the more Twitter spammers are
evolving to evade existing detection techniques. They
also propose a taxonomy of criteria for detecting Twit-
ter spammers. A series of experiments show how the
newly designed criteria feature a detection rate higher
than existing ones.
Authors of [5] classify Twitter accounts in three classes:
humans, bot, and cyborgs. The latter class represents
either a bot-assisted humans or an human-assisted bots.
Six thousands accounts have been manually classified to
create a training set and a test set, each one with 1000
accounts for each of the three classes. The authors
build their classifier based on four components: an en-
tropy component that evaluates the timing regularity of
an account tweets; a spam filter to detect spam tweets;
an account property analyzer to extract additional in-
formation; and a decision maker component. This last
one determines the class of a given account combining
the outputs of the other three parts with a multiclass
linear discriminant (LDA) analysis method.
Work in [20] makes an interesting analysis on the un-
derground phenomenon of so called Twitter Account
Markets, i.e., websites offering their subscribers to pro-
vide followers in exchange for a fee, and to spread pro-
motional tweets on their behalf. The authors list a series
of criteria that are helpful to detect Account Markets
clients that pay for acquiring followers and spam with
debatable tweets. In addition, criteria for detecting the
spammer victims are also highlighted. Results of the
analysis reveal a surprising and alarming business be-
hind this phenomenon.
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A series of reports (available at digitalevaluations.
com) have attracted the attention of Italian and Eu-
ropean newspapers and magazines (see, e.g., [4]), rais-
ing doubts on the Twitter popularity of politicians and
leading international companies. A number of criteria,
inspired by common sense and denoting human behav-
ior, are listed in the reports and used to evaluate a
sampling of the followers of selected accounts. For each
criterion satisfied by a follower, a human score is as-
signed. For each not fulfilled criterion, either a bot or
neutral score is assigned to the account. According to
the total score achieved, Twitter followers are classified
either as humans, as bots or as neutral (in this last
case, there is no sufficient information to assess their
nature), providing a quality score of the effective influ-
ence of the followed account. The results in [4] lack a
validation phase.
Beside academic work, we assisted to the prolifera-
tion of online blogger and columnist posts, listing their
own criteria for Twitter bots detection. As an exam-
ple, a well-known blogger in [17] indicates as possible
bots-like distinctive signals the fact that bots accounts:
1) have usually a huge amount of following and a small
amount of followers; 2) tweet the same thing to every-
body; and, 3) play the follow/unfollow game, meaning
that they follow/un-follow an account usually within 24
hours. Criteria advertised by online blogs are mainly
based on common sense and the authors usually do not
even suggest how to validate them.
Finally, some companies specialized in social media
analysis, like [19, 16], offer online services to analyze
how much a Twitter account is genuine in terms of its
followers. However, the criteria used for the analysis
are just partially deducible from information available
on their web sites.
In the following, we apply to our datasets the criteria
for spam and bots detection proposed by five of the cited
work, namely [21, 25, 4, 17, 16]. We are aware that
this selection is not exhaustive. However, it considers
a huge collection of criteria, that we further leverage
for our reasoning on fake follower detection. It is worth
noticing how other work for spam detection, like [9, 26],
base their results on a subset, or on a slightly modified
version, of the criteria considered by our selected set of
works.
3. REFERENCE DATASETS
In this section, we introduce the datasets of Twitter
accounts that will be used throughout the paper.
3.1 The Fake Project
The Fake Project started its activities on Decem-
ber 12, 2012, with the creation of the Twitter account
@TheFakeProject. Its profile reports the following motto:
Follow me only if you are NOT a fake and explains that
the initiative is linked with a research project owned by
researchers at IIT-CNR, in Pisa-Italy. The account bi-
ography points to the project web page http:// wafi.iit.
cnr.it/ TheFakeProject/ . At that page, one may find
instructions to join the initiative and an overall de-
scription of motivations and goals of the project. In
a first phase, the owners contacted further researchers
and journalists to advertise the initiative. The online
version of a popular Italian newspaper and a famous
Italian social media analyst promoted the project and
invited people to join it (see [14, 8] for an Italian version
of these pieces). Foreign journalists and bloggers also
supported the initiative in their countries. In a twelve
days period (Dec 12-24, 2012), the account has been
followed by 574 followers. Through Twitter API v1.1,
we crawled a series of public information from these
followers, i.e., their profiles and timeline information,
together with their followers and followings profiles. In
one day, we crawled these 574 accounts, leading to the
collection of 616,193 tweets and 971,649 relationships.
All those followers voluntarily joined the project. To
include them in our reference set of humans, we also
launched a verification phase. Each follower received a
direct message on Twitter from @TheFakeProject, con-
taining an url to a CAPTCHA, unique for each follower.
We consider as “certified human” any account that com-
pleted the CAPTCHA. We verified 469 out of the 574
followers.
3.2 #elezioni2013 dataset
The #elezioni2013 dataset was born to support a re-
search initiative for a sociological study carried out in
collaboration with the University of Perugia and the
Sapienza University of Rome, on the strategic changes
in the Italian political panorama for the 3-year period
2013-2015. Researchers identified 84,033 unique Twit-
ter accounts that used the hashtag #elezioni2013 in
their tweets, during the period between January 9 and
February 28, 2013. Identification of these accounts has
been based on specific keyword-driven queries on the
username and biography fields of the accounts’ pro-
files. Keywords include blogger, journalist, social me-
dia strategist, congressperson, representative. Specific
names of political parties have been also searched. In
conclusion, all the accounts belonging to politicians and
candidates, parties, journalists, bloggers, specific asso-
ciations and groups, and whoever somehow was offi-
cially involved in politics, have been discarded. Ac-
counts not having a biography have been discarded too.
The remaining accounts (about 40k) have been classi-
fied as citizens. This last set has been sampled (with
confidence level 95% and confidence interval 2.5), lead-
ing to a final set of 1488 accounts, that have been sub-
ject to a manual verification to determine the nature of
their profiles and tweets. Finally, 1481 accounts became
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part of dataset #elezioni2013.
3.3 Gold standard of human accounts
The above introduced datasets form our final set of
about 1950 verified human accounts. It is worth notic-
ing how the two subsets differ from each other. The
Fake Project consists of accounts that have been re-
cruited on a volunteer base: people involved in the
initiative aimed to be part of an academic study for
discovering fake followers on Twitter, and are a mix-
ture of researchers and social media experts and jour-
nalists, mostly from Italy, but also from US and other
European countries. The #elezioni2013 set consists of
particularly active Italian Twitter users, with different
professional background and belonging to diverse social
classes, sharing a common interest for politics, but that
do not belong to the following categories: politicians,
parties, journalists, bloggers.
3.4 Gold standard of fake followers
In April, 2013, we bought 3000 fake accounts from
three different Twitter online markets. In particular, we
bought 1000 fakes accounts from http:// fastfollowerz.
com, 1000 from http:// intertwitter.com, and 1000 fake
accounts from http:// twittertechnology.com, at a price
of $19, $14 and $13 respectively.
4. CRITERIA SPECIFICATION
In this section, we focus on 5 works available in the
literature [4, 25, 21, 16, 17], also reported in Section 2.
For each work, we report the authors’ observations and
criteria for anomalous account detection, further speci-
fying how we converted them into a rule to be run over
our datasets. We aim at testing the selected rules on
the datasets, to assess their strength to discriminate
fake followers. We remark that giving a judgment on
the overall quality of such criteria is beyond the scope
of this paper. They have been originally designed for
spam detection and here, for the first time, we apply
them to another category of Twitter accounts, i.e., the
fake followers.
It is also worth noticing that we focus on the appli-
cation of each single rule. Indeed, in many cases, the
analyzed paper did not specify the algorithm for aggre-
gating the proposed rules to have them to act as a de-
tector. Details on how aggregation has been performed
(and hence, it is realizable) are provided in [4] only. For
this work, we present both the results of the single rules
application and the overall aggregation results.
The analyzed criteria are divided into three main
groups: those derived from academic work, those de-
rived from blogs, and those derived from online special-
ized firms. Throughout the sequel of the paper we use
the term “friends” to denote the users followed by an
account (i.e., if A follows B, B is a friend of A).
4.1 Academic work
Among the works introduced in Section 2, we consid-
ered the most focused on automatized spam detection.
4.1.1 Detecting spammers in social networks
The work presented in [21] focuses on detecting spam-
bots and exploits five features, that can be gathered
crawling an account’s details. Per each account, such
features are given as input to a Random Forest algo-
rithm, that outputs if the account is a spambot or not.
Without the original training set, we were unable to re-
produce the same classifier, but we picked its features,
as summarized in Appendix A.1, and we report its de-
tection effectiveness in Section 5.
4.1.2 Fighting evolving Twitter spammers
The authors of [25] observed that Twitter spammers
often modify their behavior in order to evade exist-
ing spam detection techniques. Thus, they suggested
new metrics, making evasion more difficult for spam-
mers. Beyond the metrics directly available from the ac-
count profile lookup, the authors propose some graph-,
automation-, and timing-based metrics, as detailed in
Appendix A.2. The authors propose to combine their
metrics in four different machine learning classifiers and
compare their implementation with other existing ap-
proaches. We were unable to completely reproduce their
machine learning classifiers since we had a different dataset,
but here we evaluate most of those metrics claimed by
the authors to be quite robust against evasion tech-
niques.
4.1.3 Followers of political candidates
Camisani [4] carried out a series of tests over samples
of Twitter followers of Romney and Obama, for the last
US presidential elections candidates, as well as for pop-
ular Italian politicians. In particular, in [4] it is detailed
an algorithm to evaluate the account nature based on
some of its public features. For each feature, the al-
gorithm assigns a human and a bot/inactive score and
classifies an account considering the gap between the
two scores. The algorithm reported in [4] has enough
details to be fully implemented. We report in the fol-
lowing section the results of testing each single rule, as
well as their aggregate.
4.2 Blogs
Several bloggers propose their golden rules to iden-
tify suspicious Twitter accounts. Here, we consider the
7 signals to look out for recognizing Twitter bots (see
Appendix A.4), according to the founder of the social
media website stateofsearch.com [17]. As detailed in
Appendix, we were able to apply only a subset of the
seven suggestions to our gold standard and the results
are in Table 1.
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4.3 Online analyzers
Several social media firms provide online tools to clas-
sify Twitter followers based on a fakeness degree. Here,
we consider the FakeFollowerCheck tool, by Socialbak-
ers [16]. Their website provides eight criteria (detailed
in Appendix A.5) to evaluate the fakeness degree of the
followers of a certain account, but omits details on how
to combine such criteria to classify the account. We
contacted the customer service of the social media firm,
but were answered that “how the respective criteria are
measured is rather an internal information”. In Table 1,
we report how each single criterion is able to classify our
accounts.
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
All the rules detailed in Appendix A, and related to
the work recalled in Section 4 have been applied to a
mixed dataset, composed of a priori known human ac-
counts, belonging to The Fake Project (469 verified ac-
counts) and to #elezioni2013 (1481 verified accounts),
as well as the fake accounts bought from the Twitter ac-
count markets. In particular, we randomly chose 1950
out of the 3000 fake accounts we have, to obtain a mixed
and balanced dataset of 3900 account composed by 50%
of humans and 50% of fakes.
5.1 Evaluation
Being interested in fake follower detection, we con-
sidered the ability of each rule to detect a fake account.
The results of rules application are summarized in Ta-
ble 1 and, specifically, in the table we reported:
• True Positive TP: the number of those fake follow-
ers recognized by the rule as fakes;
• True Negative TN: the number of those human
followers recognized by the rule as humans;
• False Positive FP: the number of those human ac-
counts recognized by the rule as fakes;
• False Negative FN: the number of those fake ac-
counts recognized by the rule as humans.
To evaluate the quality of a rule, we consider the fol-
lowing standard evaluation metrics:
• Precision: the proportion of predicted positive cases
that are indeed real positive, that is TPTP+FP ;
• Recall: the proportion of real positive cases that
are predicted positive, that is TPTP+FN ;
• F-Measure: the harmonic mean of precision and
recall, namely 2 precision·recallprecision+recall
• Matthew Correlation Coefficient MCC [2]: the es-
timator of the correlation between the predicted
class and the real class of the samples. This met-
ric is considered the unbiased version of the F-




Since an MCC value close to 1 means that the prediction
is really accurate, in Table 1 we highlight those criteria
whose application gives MCC ≥ 0.75: among the fifty
rules that we have applied to our mixed dataset, such
rules have the strongest correlation with the typology
of the accounts.
Finally, for such rules that generically say “profiles
with high (resp., low) values of attribute X are less
likely to be Y” (where, in the original rule, Y can be ei-
ther spambot or human), we consider a fixed threshold
evaluated according to the common rule of information
gain with continuous attributes, see [11]: we sort the
examples according to the continuous attribute X, we
identify the possible threshold values, and evaluate the
information gain associated with each of them, to select
the best performing one. In the Appendix, we precisely
report, rule by rule, the used thresholds.
Please notice that for some rows of the table the num-
ber of evaluated accounts is lower than 3900. This is be-
cause we were unable to evaluate some of the proposed
ratios for many accounts of our dataset. For example,
1554 accounts had no tweets from API, then the API
URL ratio was impossible to evaluate (00 ).
5.2 Discussion
In Table 1, we mark as highlighted those rules whose
application on our mixed dataset obtained an MCC
value ≤ 0.75. Visibly, only four rules passed this test,
namely, the friends to followerŝ2 ratio, the bidirec-
tional link ratio, the API ratio, and the threshold 30
over the number of followers. Even by lowering the
MCC threshold, e.g., by fixing it equal to 0.6, only two
further rules passed the threshold.
Noticeably, none of the criteria suggested by online
blogs and those addressed by online tools, such as the
SocialBakers FakeFollowerCheck, are successful in de-
tecting the fakes in our dataset. Hence, this call for
further investigations to characterize the account Twit-
tersphere.
We acknowledge that our fake followers dataset could
be illustrative, and not exhaustive, of all the possible ex-
isting sets of fakes. However, it is worth noticing that
we found the Twitter accounts marketplaces by sim-
ply Web searching on the most common search engine.
Thus, it can be argued that our dataset represents what
is usually possible to be found on the Web.
Overall, we observe that the four rules in Table 1 that
have obtained the best evaluation metrics, although ap-
plied in past work to detect spam behavior, are the best
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results evaluation metrics
rule description TP TN FP FN precision recall F-M. MCC
Stringhini et al. [21]
1 friends ≤ 500 1527 578 1372 423 0.527 0.783 0.629 0.091
2 tweets ≤ 20 717 1882 68 1233 0.913 0.368 0.524 0.415
3 tweet similarity 187 1578 372 1763 0.335 0.096 0.149 -0.135
4 URL Ratio 967 1920 26 893 0.974 0.520 0.678 0.577
5 friends/(followers)̂2 1816 1850 95 90 0.950 0.953 0.952 0.904
Yang et al. [25]
1 age 308 1420 746 1455 0.292 0.175 0.219 -0.191
2 bidirectional link ratio 1888 1927 18 24 0.991 0.987 0.989 0.978
3 average neighbors’ followers 1909 648 1299 38 0.595 0.980 0.741 0.411
4 average neighbors’ tweets 1291 1518 430 616 0.750 0.677 0.712 0.459
5 followings/median neighbor’s followers 1926 916 1031 21 0.651 0.989 0.785 0.538
6 API ratio 1431 1917 29 429 0.980 0.769 0.862 0.776
7 API URL ratio 141 1851 66 288 0.681 0.329 0.443 0.401
8 API tweet similarity 87 2157 9 1676 0.906 0.049 0.094 0.146
9 following rate 1597 1458 492 353 0.764 0.819 0.791 0.568
Camisani–Calzolari [4] (rules detecting human behavior)
1 profile has name 0 1950 0 1950 — — — —
2 profile has image 2 1931 19 1948 0.095 0.001 0.002 -0.06
3 profile has address 323 1313 637 1627 0.336 0.166 0.222 -0.187
4 profile has biography 617 1806 144 1333 0.811 0.316 0.455 0.306
5 followers ≥ 30 1852 1582 368 98 0.834 0.95 0.888 0.768
6 belongs to a list 1893 1052 898 57 0.678 0.971 0.799 0.566
7 tweets ≥ 50 1582 1792 158 368 0.909 0.811 0.857 0.735
8 geo-localization 1923 678 1272 27 0.602 0.986 0.748 0.434
9 has URL in profile 1895 697 1253 55 0.602 0.972 0.743 0.417
10 in favorites 1130 1748 202 820 0.848 0.579 0.689 0.502
11 uses punctuation in tweets 93 1948 2 1857 0.979 0.048 0.091 0.151
12 uses hashtags 437 1934 16 1513 0.965 0.224 0.364 0.337
13 uses iPhone to log in 1905 845 1105 45 0.633 0.977 0.768 0.489
14 uses Android to log in 1932 677 1273 18 0.603 0.991 0.75 0.442
15 has connected with Foursquare 1943 261 1689 7 0.535 0.996 0.696 0.257
16 has connected with Instagram 1890 772 1178 60 0.616 0.969 0.753 0.446
17 uses the website Twitter.com 131 1852 98 1819 0.572 0.067 0.12 0.036
18 has tweeted a userID 1071 1941 9 879 0.992 0.549 0.707 0.609
19 2*followers ≥ friends 1947 863 1087 3 0.642 0.998 0.781 0.531
20 tweets do not just contain URLs 125 1943 7 1825 0.947 0.064 0.12 0.167
21 retwitted tweets ≥ 1 1021 1915 35 929 0.967 0.524 0.679 0.569
22 uses different clients to log in 118 1924 26 1832 0.819 0.061 0.113 0.125
Van Den Beld (State of search) [17]
1 bot in biography 0 1950 0 1950 — — — —
2 following:followers = 100:1 158 1950 0 1792 0.541 1 0.15 0.205
3 same sentence to many accounts 188 1521 429 1762 0.438 0.78 0.146 -0.169
4 duplicate profile pictures 26 1809 141 1924 0.471 0.928 0.025 -0.146
5 tweet from API 429 33 1917 1521 0.118 0.017 0.2 -0.779
Socialbakers [16]
1 friends:followers ≥ 50:1 316 1949 1 1634 0.997 0.162 0.279 0.296
2 tweets spam phrases 5 1950 0 1945 1 0.003 0.005 0.036
3 same tweet ≥ 3 30 1327 623 1920 0.046 0.015 0.023 -0.407
4 retweets ≥ 90% 14 1933 17 1936 0.452 0.007 0.014 -0.009
5 tweet-links≥ 90% 58 1936 14 1892 0.806 0.03 0.057 0.084
6 0 tweets 84 1949 1 1866 0.988 0.043 0.083 0.146
7 default image after 2 months 2 1931 19 1948 0.095 0.001 0.002 -0.06
8 no bio, no location, friends ≥100 255 1927 23 1695 0.917 0.131 0.229 0.231
Table 1: Rules evaluation
candidate rules for training classifiers for fake follower
detection.
5.2.1 Camisani-Calzolari detection algorithm
Table 2 reports the results of the detection algorithm
proposed in [4], aggregating the 22 criteria for human/bot
behavior detection. In particular, the algorithm evalu-
ates every single rule on each account and assigns a
positive human score and a negative bot score, based
on the single rule output, as described in Appendix A.3.
The final outcome depends on the score obtained by the
account: if the result is a score greater than 0, then the
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outcome
dataset real humans humans bots neutral
@TheFakeProject 469 456 3 10
#elezioni2013 1481 1480 0 1
100% fake 0 2889 185 277
Table 2: Camisani-Calzolari algorithm outcomes
on our gold standard datasets
account is marked as “human”; if it is between 0 and
-4 it is marked as “neutral”, otherwise it is marked as
“bot”.
After applying the algorithm to our mixed dataset,
we observe that, although obtaining very good results
in detecting the real human accounts, it achieves a poor
fake account detection. Most of them have been erro-
neously tagged as humans too. The main motivation
of this unsatisfactory result is that our fake follower
accounts feature characteristics that easily make them
obtaining a human score higher than the bot one. This
strengthens the thesis of this paper: detecting fake fol-
lowers is a specific research topic deserving further in-
vestigations.
6. TAXONOMY OF FOLLOWERS
In this section, we present a classification of Twitter
followers based on multiple dimensions derived from re-
sults exposed in previous sections.
Categories. We start considering the following three
categories for Twitter followers:
1. Humans
2. Bots, i.e., automated programs, that can be fur-
ther partitioned in:
• benign: those automated accounts programmed
to, e.g., regularly post a large volume of be-
nign tweets, like news and blogs updates [5]
• malicious:, those automated programs mainly
exploited to spread spam and malicious con-
tents. In the following, similar to [21], we refer
to this sub-category as spambots.
3. Fake followers, either automated programs, or hu-
man accounts. Note that an human account can be
classified as fake when the owner of the account has
been victim of an attack finalized at stealing her
authentication credentials, as highlighted in [20],
and these credentials have been later used by a
third party.
Dimensions. We propose to consider the following
six dimensions, with the aim to characterize followers
as belonging to one of the above introduced categories.
1. Automation, indicating the level of automation of
the account (i.e., fully, partly, or not automated).
2. Purpose of use, that is, the motivations that drive
a user to use Twitter.
3. Link rationale, that is, the rationales motivating
why account a chooses to follow account b.
4. Tweet number, i.e., a measure of how many tweets
an account posts over a period of time.
5. Audience, indicating the modality employed by an
account to post its messages (either tweets, hence
broadcast to all its followers, or direct messages to
another account, not publicly visible).
6. Expression of interest, denoting how the account
relates and interacts with other ones. This dimen-
sion can be measured by, e.g., the degree of oc-
currence of mentions and replies in those tweets
posted by the account, or by the number of times
an account’s tweet is a retweet.
Below, we discuss the three categories through the
above-introduced dimensions. We also show a qualita-
tive and visual comparison through three radar graphs
reported in Figure 1.
Automation. A classification of Twitter followers based
on their automation level has been given in [5], where
the authors differentiate among bots, humans, and cy-
borgs. While bots are fully automated programs, hu-
mans feature manual behavior, and cyborgs interweave
characteristics of both manual and automated behav-
ior. For example, a human may register an account
and set automated programs to post tweets during her
absence. According to [20], that explains the dynam-
ics around Twitter markets, and from the analysis of
our datasets of fakes, we also argue that fake followers
can be either automated programs, or human accounts
(with a preponderance of the former). Moreover, it is
worth noticing how the human fake followers usually
follow the target account without being aware of it,
either because they have given away (on a voluntary
basis) their credentials (that are later used by a third
party) or because they are victims of Twitter Account
Markets [20]. Given these considerations, we decided to
associate a very high level of automation to spambots,
a very low one to human accounts, and an average one
to fake followers, see Figure 1.
Purpose of use. Works in [20, 21, 25] on spam de-
tection identify, as typical activities for spambots on
Twitter, the sending of unsolicited promotional tweets
to, e.g., advertise questionable websites or products; the
spread of malware; soliciting illicit activities [13] On the
contrary, humans’ main use of Twitter is for microblog-
ging, quick answers from crowd, keeping up with the
news, finding out what other people think about poli-
tics, books, a particular brand of body wash, etc. [1].
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Figure 1: Human, Fake and Spambot classification through six dimensions.
Finally, fake followers are those followers explicitly cre-
ated with the goal of inflating the number of follower
of a target account, contributing in such a way to in-
crease popularity and online reputation of the target,
see, e.g. [20]. To graphically render this dimension, we
decided to map it to the bad behavior axis in the radar-
fashion Figure 1, thus achieving a fully bad behavior for
spambots, a very low level (even null) for humans, and
a neutral level for fake followers.
Link rationale. By construction, spambots do not
follow a particular rationale to follow some particular
accounts, in contrast with human accounts. This is dis-
cussed more formally in [25], that model the Twitter-
sphere as a graph where each account is a node, and
every following/follower relationship is an edge. Work
in [25] notes that, “since spammers usually blindly fol-
low other accounts, these accounts usually do not know
each other and have a looser relationship among them”,
thus, they do not form a clique; in addition, following
such unrelated accounts, the spambot will create new
shortest paths between those that re-follow it, leading
to a position in the graph more central for the spam-
bot than for human accounts. Finally, the number of
bidirectional links has been shown to be higher for an
human account than for a spambot (see Appendix A.2
for details). As it can be derived from our analysis –
Section 5 – some conclusions that are valid for spambots
also apply to fake followers: bidirectional links help to
recognize fake followers since usually the followed ac-
count has no interest in following back a fake. This
leads us to conclude that graph-based features can help
in understanding the rationale of fakes. When com-
paring spambots, fake and humans, we can say that
spambots and fake are more prone to randomly fol-
low other accounts, whereas humans are more prone
to form cliques, since friends and relatives usually fol-
low each other. Finally, the link rationale that causes
fake followers to follow who paid for this service (being
followed) could be the only element to distinguish the
random link rationale of spambots. Graphically, we as-
sign a high link rationale to humans, low link rationale
to spambots, and an average link rational to fakes, see
Figure 1.
Tweet number. In [21], the authors created a num-
ber of honey profiles on Twitter, that received, over
an 11 months period, about 360 friend requests from
spambots. By analyzing the activity of the spambots,
the authors conclude that, compared to legitimate users
(humans), they are less likely to send hundreds of tweets
(most of them sent less than twenty messages). To sup-
port this observation, note that also the authors of [25]
noticed that all spambots under investigation sent a
much lower number of tweets than legitimate accounts.
However, spambots can use specialized softwares to au-
tomatically post tweets. From the analysis of our re-
sults, the number of tweets of the fakes is also signifi-
cantly less than that of humans. Indeed, only 19% of
the fakes in our mixed dataset have written at least 50
tweets (at the time those accounts have been crawled),
compared to an average of 88% of the human accounts
in #elezioni2013 (95%) and @FakeProject (81%). We
conclude that both fakes and spambots usually send a
quite lower number of tweets with respect to human
accounts.
Audience. In [21], the authors find that 20 out of the
360 spambots following their honey profiles have sent di-
rect messages (DMs) to those profiles. Such spambots
have been denoted as whisperers, in contrast to brag-
gers, this latter ones being spambots that spam through
public tweets. Surfing the Web, one can easily find tools
featuring the cleaning up of Direct Messages Inbox from
spam, e.g., [10]. No tool is provided by Twitter to mon-
itor sent and received DMs. Thus, an exact evaluation
of this dimension is highly challenging. However, our
sets of 3000 fakes follow three distinct honey accounts,
and none of them has ever received a direct message
from any of the following accounts. Thus, we may con-
clude that a difference exists between a spambot and a
fake follower behavior. In particular, in their attitude
to make use of direct messages. Reasonably, we can
also assert that the account attitude to send direct mes-
sages could be definitely exploited by Twitter to spot
spam-like (and human-like) behaviours. For classifica-
tion purposes, we conclude that spambots send more
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DMs than humans, that, in turn, send more DMs than
fakes. However, this analysis is preliminary and de-
serves further investigation.
Expression of Interest. We may define several met-
rics to weigh this dimension, e.g., the mention ratio,
i.e., tweets with mentionstotal tweets (the number of tweets contain-
ing mentions over the total number of tweets for an ac-
count); the retweet ratio, i.e., retweeted tweetstotal tweets (the num-
ber of tweets that are retweets of other users tweets
over the total number of tweets for an account); and
the reply ratio, i.e., repliestotal tweets (the number of tweets
that are replies over the total number of tweets for an
account). Interestingly, two of these three metrics have
been used to detect spambots in [24, 9], where quantita-
tive results on training datasets show that the values for
these ratios are significantly higher for spambots than
for humans. We have adopted the rule of information
gain with continuous attributes to test such results on
our mixed dataset, and we have achieved an opposite
result: none of our fakes have ever replied to some other
tweets (threshold = 0). In addition, the mention ratio
threshold is quite low, 0.18 (if mention ratio ≤ 0.18,
the account in our mixed dataset is a fake follower).
We have also computed the threshold for the retweet
ratio (if retweet ratio ≤ 0.05, the account in our mixed
dataset is classified as a fake follower), but we cannot
compare this last result with a measure for spambots,
since we were unable to find related work in the litera-
ture considering this metric. We can thus conclude that
the expression of interest is higher for spambots, lower
for fakes, while human accounts lie in between.
The list of suggested dimensions is not exhaustive.
As an example, one could adopt as a dimension the way
tweets are stylistically composed (e.g., if all tweets by an
account are written in the same language). Although
other dimensions could have been caught as well, we
believe that the six ones reported above help to capture
the main features needed to characterize an account.
Finally, while conclusions drawn around some dimen-
sions are highly supported by the current analysis and
past investigations, some others, while being plausible
deductions, call for further research. Table 6 classifies
the six dimensions based on how much our proposed
taxonomy is supported by experimental data.
dimension support
Automation high
Purpose of Use high
Link Rationale medium
Number of Tweets medium
Audience low
Expression of Interest medium
Table 3: Support per dimension
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we have shed light on the lack of rigor-
ous definitions and criteria for the identification of fake
account on Twitter. Further, we have also provided the
basis for further investigation in this direction.
In particular, to reach the first goal, we created two gold
standard; one of human and one of fake accounts. Aim-
ing at detecting the latter ones, given the lack of specific
criteria, we identified a set of criteria proposed in the
literature as well as in the media to target spambots and
inactive accounts, and we tested their effectiveness on
our reference dataset. Noticeably, just few criteria suc-
ceeded in correctly detecting the fake followers. This
result supported our thesis that fake detection repre-
sents an open research issue.
A promising starting point to develop automatic classi-
fiers for fake detection is provided by the criteria iden-
tified in this paper. A further contribution was to cre-
ate a novel taxonomy, comparing humans, spambots,
and fakes, through multiple dimensions. The taxonomy
gives us hints on which dimensions are more relevant to
discriminate between fakes and spambots.
As future work, we aim to design an automated fake
detector engine, leveraging the dimensions proposed in
our taxonomy and exploiting the main differences we
found between the different account categories.
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APPENDIX
A. CRITERIA DETAILS
Here, we detail those criteria proposed in [21, 25, 4,
17, 16] for spam/bot detection on Twitter. As described
in Section 5, such criteria have been applied to our gold
standard to investigate their strength in discerning hu-
mans and fake followers.
For each group of criteria we also detail how we ad-
dress, at implementation level, some ambiguities and/or
technical problems that would have, potentially, affected
the final outcome of the evaluation. For each of some is-
sues, we provide a note explaining how it was addressed.
Hereafter, we report the thresholds used for all those
rules in Table 4 requiring a comparison of the measured
value with a fixed value. Such thresholds have been
fixed according to the information gain rule [11].
criterion account is fake when
Stringhini et al. [21]
4 URL Ratio ≤ 0.056051
5 friends/(followers)̂2 > 0.493827
Yang et al. [25]
2 bidirectional link ratio ≤ 0.064541
3 average friends’ followers ≤ 389913
4 average friends’ tweets ≤ 3068.6
5 friends/median friends’ followers > 0.078602
6 API ratio ≤ 0
7 API URL ratio > 0.997992
9 following rate > 0.631206
Table 4: Thresholds used to evaluate the rules
A.1 Detecting spammers in social networks
The authors in [21] identify the following characteris-
tics, that allow a classifier to detect spambots on Twit-
ter. The account under investigation may show a spam-
bot behavior if:
1. it does not have thousands of friends;
2. it has sent less than 20 tweets;
3. the content of its tweets feature the so called mes-
sage similarity;
4. it has a high tweets containing URLstotal tweets ratio (URL ra-
tio);
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5. it has a high friends
(followers)̂2 ratio value (i.e., lower ratio
values mean legitimate users).
Notes.
For the rule 1 we fix the threshold equal to 500.
For the rule 3 we implemented the notion of mes-
sage similarity by checking the existence of at least two
tweets, in the last 15 tweets of the account timeline, in
which 4 consecutive words are equal (words are consecu-
tive characters separated by white spaces). This notion
has been given in a latter work by the same authors,
see [20].
For the rules 4 and 5 we used the thresholds in Ta-
ble 4, obtained as detailed in Section 5.
A.2 Fighting evolving Twitter spammers
The authors of [25] propose a set of metrics that
should be highly robust against spammer evasion tech-
niques. Hereafter, we detail nine of their properties:
1. age: the more an account is aged, the more it could
be considered a good one (this rule also appears
in [9]);
2. bidirectional link ratio is bidirectional linksfriends , where a
bidirectional link is when two accounts follow each
other among them. This ratio has been tested to
be lower for spammers accounts than for legitimate
accounts;
3. average neighbors’ followers represents the average
number of followers of the account’s friends, and it
aims at reflecting the quality of the choice of friends
of an account. It is commonly higher for legitimate
accounts than for spammers;
4. average neighbors’ tweets: the average number of
tweets of the account’s followers should be lower
for spammers than for legitimate accounts;
5. followings to median neighbor’s followers of an ac-
count is defined as the ratio between the number
of friends and the median of the followers of his
friends: this value has been found higher for spam-
mers than for legitimate accounts;
6. API ratio (= n.tweets sent from API / total n.
tweets): work in [5, 25] reveal higher values for
suspicious accounts;
7. API url ratio (= n.tweets posted from API and
containing URL / total n.tweets posted from API).
This value is higher for suspicious accounts;
8. API tweet similarity: this metric considers the num-
ber of similar tweets sent from API. The notion of
tweet similarity is as in Section A.1;
9. following rate: this metric reflects the speed at
which an accounts follows other accounts, and the
idea is that higher values are related to spammers.
Interestingly, the authors of [25] also suggest two fur-
ther graph-based metrics. Seeing the Twittersphere as
a graph, where accounts are nodes, and each follow rela-
tionship is an edge, the first metric is the local clustering
coefficient, that quantifies how close the neighbors of
a node in a graph are to be a clique. The intuitive
idea behind this metric is that spammers blindly follow
other accounts, that do not know each other and have a
looser relationship among them, thus, they do not form
a clique. Thus, spammers have lower local clustering
coefficients, compared to humans. The second metric
is the betweenness centrality which reflects the position
of a node in the graph (namely how much a node is
involved in the shortest paths between all the possible
vertices pair). The intuitive idea behind this metric is
that, following unrelated accounts, the spammer will
create new shortest paths between those who re-follow
it, leading to a position in the graph more central for
the spammer than for human accounts.
Although these metrics should be very effective to
recognize spammers, unfortunately they are extremely
expensive to evaluate and the same authors evaluated
it using a sampling techniques. This is the reason why
we have not implemented them in our analysis, and,
thus, how these metrics behave in discriminating fake
followers is an open issue.
Finally, the authors review other metrics claimed to
be less robust against evasion techniques. For this rea-
son, we decided not to include them in our evaluation.
Notes.
Precisely evaluating rule 9 requires to know the evo-
lution of the number of friends of an account. Actually
this kind of information is publicly unavailable. Thus,
as in [25], we also approximate the rate as friends / age.
A.3 Followers of political candidates
The technical report [4] aims at detecting bot or inac-
tive accounts, using a series of tests. The study assigns
to the examined accounts 1 (or more, where specified)
human (or “active”) point for each of the following cri-
teria:
1. the profile contains a name;
2. the profile contains an image;
3. the profile contains a physical address;
4. the profile contains a biography;
5. the account has at least 30 followers;
6. it has been inserted in a list by other Twitter users;
7. it has written at least 50 tweets;
8. the account has been geo-localized;
9. the profile contains a URL;
10. it has been included in another user’s favorites;
11. it writes tweets that have punctuation;
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12. it has used a hashtag in at least one tweet;
13. it has logged into Twitter using an iPhone;
14. it has logged into Twitter using an device with An-
droid ;
15. it has connected with Foursquare;
16. it has connected with Instagram;
17. it has logged into twitter.com website;
18. it has written the userID of another user in at least
one tweet;
19. 2*number followers ≥ number of friends;
20. it publishes content which does not just contain
URLs;
21. at least one of its tweets has been re-twitted by
other accounts (it’s worth 2 points);
22. it has logged into Twitter through different clients
(it’s worth 3 points).
Moreover, for each criterion not verified, the account
receives 1 bot (or “inactive”) point, with the exception
of criteria 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17. For the criterion 21, 2
bot points are assigned if no tweets of the account have
been retweeted by other users.
Notes.
For the rule 8, geo-localization is related to tweets.
Thus, we consider this rule satisfied when at least one
tweet of the account has been geo-localized.
For the rule 11, punctuation has been searched in
both the profile biography and in its timeline.
A.4 Blogs
The “7 signals to look out for” recognizing Twitter
bots are the following [17]:
1. the biography of the profile clearly specifies that it
is a bot account;
2. the friends to followers ratio is in the order of 100:1;
3. the account tweets the same sentence to many other
accounts;
4. different accounts with duplicate profile pictures
are suspicious;
5. accounts that tweet from API are suspicious;
6. the response time (follow+reply) to tweets of other
accounts is within milliseconds;
7. the account tends to follow/unfollow other accounts
within a temporal arc of 24 hours.
Notes.
We did not apply rules 6 and 7 to our datasets, since
they require to actively interact with the account. This
means that those rules cannot be used for an automatic
process of fake detection.
The rule 3 has been implemented considering the
tweet as a single unit (contrary to tweet similarity, that
focuses on the occurrence of the same four consecutive
words in two or more tweets). The last 20 tweets of
each timeline have been considered.
For the rule 4, we consider a duplicate profile picture
when at least 3 accounts within a dataset have the same
profile picture.
For the rule 5, we consider as tweets posted from
API all those tweets not being posted from the website
twitter.com.
A.5 Socialbakers Fake Follower Check
The Fake Follower Check tool by the social media firm
Socialbakers [16] evaluates the fakeness of an account
followers using the following criteria:
1. friendsfollowers ratio is 50:1 or more;
2. more than 30% of all tweets use spam phrases, such
as “diet”, “make money” and “work from home”;
3. the same tweets are repeated more than three times,
even when posted to different accounts;
4. more than 90% of the account tweets are retweets;
5. more than 90% of the account tweets are links;
6. the account has never tweeted;
7. the account is more than two months old and still
has a default profile image;
8. the user didn’t fill in neither bio nor location and,
at the same time, is following more than 100 ac-
counts.
The Socialbakers website reports the Fake Follower Check
as a beta version, adding the following: “We are cur-
rently tweaking the algorithm”. Thus, we consider the
criteria published on the firm website at time of writing,
in June 2013.
Notes.
For the rule 2, we consider as spam phrases expres-
sions like “diet” or “make money” or “work from home”
(both English and Italian translations), as suggested by
the website of Socialbakers.
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